The decision concerned a dispute among the children of Austin Jude (Austin) which arose on his death in September 2007. Austin’s children were the appellants - Vandyke, a lawyer in California, and Diane. Della and Beverly were respondents to the appeal.

Austin owned or part-owned numerous parcels of land in the Marigot Bay area of St Lucia. Some were owned directly, others through a company with many of the interests held legally by his long-time associate and lawyer Kenneth Monplaisir, (Monplaisir) but protected by a restriction.

Following a bitter divorce in 1997 that left Vandyke estranged from Austin the couple remarried in 2005 before the distribution of land in the divorce settlement was finalised.

Austin asked Vandyke to negotiate with Monplaisir to partition the land. Vandyke imposed certain conditions relating to various plots including that Austin grant a power of attorney, (the POA) to Diane. Austin agreed but insisted on a stipulation that Diane would always consult him before exercising the powers under the POA.

In March 2007 Austin travelled from St Lucia to London for medical treatment. In April Della emailed her siblings with a letter she claimed was dictated by Austin purporting to revoke the POA. Austin later denied dictating the letter.

In July 2007 Vandyke and Diane signed two deeds of transfer executed by a notary transferring various plots from Monplaisir to Austin, and then on to Vandyke and Diane. Della and Beverly claimed inter alia in St Lucia court proceedings that the deeds had been procured by undue influence and were therefore null and void. The judge at first instance rejected the claims, describing Vandyke and Diane as truthful witnesses whereas Della “was not lacking in guile.” The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (ECSC) overturned the decision as to undue influence.

The PC found that the ECSC had made several errors of law, principally by failing to make it clear that undue influence is a single concept with two ways to prove it; actual, (it can be proven by reference to the facts) or presumed, (a relationship of trust and confidence exists between the settlor and the beneficiary of the transaction). The relationship between solicitor and client is an example of the latter. The ECSC had also ignored the first instance judge’s view of the witnesses, instead substituting their own judgment that Vandyke’s claims were “stretching credulity”.

The PC ruled that the first instance judge had been right to rule that there was no evidence to support a finding of actual influence and set out a three-stage analysis for claims of presumed influence:

1. That there is a relationship of trust and confidence;
2. The transactions (in this case the deeds of transfer) were not readily explicable by ordinary motives;

If the answer to these questions is yes, the presumption is established and the analysis moves to the third stage; Vandyke would need to prove that Austin was exercising free and independent judgment.

On the facts the PC found that the first element was demonstrated, but the second stage was not, as Vandyke was plainly being recompensed for legal work, for building a new marital home for Austin and for buying Monplaisir’s interest in various plots. However, they went on to consider the third stage.

The PC found that “despite his,” (Austin’s) “failing health and periods of confusion and forgetfulness, he still wanted to “call the shots.” Therefore, even if the rebuttable presumption existed the evidence was sufficient to rebut it even though Austin had not received independent legal advice.

The law of undue influence in England and St Lucia are the same. Harneys does not advise on matters of English law. However, this decision will be closely studied and practitioners in all common law offshore jurisdictions will no doubt note the evidential requirements for cases of presumed influence.